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JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE FOR
THE FOREIGN "TRIBUNAL"
The judicial assistance available to foreign governmental
agencies in the United States was greatly expanded by the 1964
amendments to the federal assistance statute. Most significant
was the insertion of the term "tribunal" to define the type of
body which could secure aid from the federal courts. Judicial
construction of the new term, however, has presented some
difficulties resulting in the denial of assistance to foreign states.
This note reviews the policy considerations and legislative
history relevant to defining "tribunal," and posits factors to be
weighed in establishing a more efficacious "tribunal" test.
T HE EFFICIENT administration of justice sometimes requires the
cooperation of a foreign court to obtain testimony, documents or
other evidence. Foreign court assistance in securing evidence in the
proper form can often be of critical importance. A refusal to grant
aid, or aid rendered in" an unusable form, may interfere with, or
completely block, the judicial processes.' Because non-compliance
with requests for judicial assistance does not constitute a violation of
international law,2 international judicial cooperation must be founded
upon treaties, domestic law or general principles of comity. 3
United States cooperation in this area has generally been of a
more limited scope than that available in the countries of Europe.4 In
1964, however, amendments to section 1782 of the United States
Code were enacted to significantly increase federal court assistance
available to foreign and international tribunals in securing testimony,
statements and documents.' An important change in the law was the
'Lenhoff, Reciprocity and the Law of Foreign Judgments: a Historical-Critical Analysis, 16
LA. L. REV. 465,470 (1956).
2 Id. at 469.
International judicial assistance is not limited to aid in securing testimony, statements and
documents. It may also include executive aid in extradition, the recognition and execution of
foreign judgments, the service of documents for a foreign country, and information on foreign
law. Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program for Reform, 62
YALE L.J. 515, 516 (1953).
'See Id. at 515-18. See generally COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW PROJECT ON
INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE, INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN LITIGATION: EUROPE (H. Smit
ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL Co-OPERATION IN LITIGATION].
128 U.S.C. § 1782 (1964).
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replacement of the word "court" with the more general term
"tribunal," to describe the type of governmental body which could
secure aid under revised section 1782. Judicial construction of the
term "tribunal" will determine in large measure the usefulness of the
new statute and the attitude of the United States toward international
judicial assistance. The policy considerations and legislative history
relevant in construing the new term are the subject of this note.
Often testimony, statements and documents can be secured
without formal court assistance through depositions or commissions.6
Nevertheless, uncooperative witnesses and laws which prohibit private
interrogation7 frequently necessitate recourse to court aid. Judicial
assistance has traditionally been secured through letters
rogatory-formal requests addressed to a foreign judicial authority,
usually sent through diplomatic channels, requesting the authority to
exercise its power to secure the testimony or other evidence required
for a proceeding pending in the court requesting aid.9
The majority of nations have entered into treaties which provide
for international judicial assistance. 0 The United States has
traditionally refused to enter into such treaties on the ground that,
because of our federal system, the subject is too complex to be handled
6E.g., id. at § 1782(b); FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b); INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN LITIGATION
80-81 (English procedures).
7 See, e.g., Swiss Penal Code art. 271. Art. 271 is interpreted by the Swiss government to
prohibit the private interrogation of persons if such interrogation would ordinarily be performed
by a Swiss government official. INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN LrrIoATION 365 & n. 15.
' There is some authority to the effect that judicial assistance is never granted in criminal
cases. E.g., In re Letters Rogatory From Examining Magistrate of Tribunal of Versailles,
France, 26 F. Supp. 852 (D. Md. 1939); In re Letters Rogatory of the Gov't of Italy (Denver,
Colo. Dist. Ct., Jan. 12, 1960) reported in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 406 (G. Mueller & E.
Wise eds. 1965); In re Jenckes, 6 R.I. 18 (1859); Letter from United States Circuit Court Judge
Morrow to Counsul General of Mexico, April 9, 1909, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 1011 (1909). Contra,
Exparte Taylor, 110 Tex. 331, 220 S.W. 74 (1920); Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021,
1029 (LB. 1774). See generally Mueller, International Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters,
7 VILL. L. REv. 193 (1961-62).
9 Jones, Letters Rogatory in Federal Practice in LETTERS ROGATORY-A SYMPOSIUM 73
(Grossman ed. 1956). Although American courts tend to think of letters rogatory solely as a
means of procuring testimony, e.g., In re Letters Rogatory Out of First Civil Court of City of
Mexico, 261 F. 652, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1919); In re Romero, 56 Misc. 319, 107 N.Y. Supp. 621
(1907), they may also be used to serve summons or a copy of a complaint, conduct an
investigation, examine premises involved in litigation, take extracts of books of account, and
appoint a temporary administrator of an estate. Jones, supra note 3, at 543-44.
"1 See, e.g., Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Judicial Assistance,
33 AM. J. INT'L L. 11, 119-28 (Supp. 1939).
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by treaty." As an alternative, the United States has promulgated
statutes which authorize the federal courts to grant judicial assistance.
The first such law, enacted in 1855, authorized federal courts, in
response to letters rogatory, to appoint a commissioner "empowered
to compel the witnesses to appear and testify in court."' 2 A second;
more limited statute, passed in 1863, provided for the execution of
letters rogatory only in suits fQr money judgments involving a foreign
government.'3 Because of the narrow and hostile construction given
this statute by the courts,'4 Congress, in the 1948 revision of the
Judiciary Code, provided express permission for the taking of
depositions of any person residing in the United States for use in a
civil action pending in the court of a foreign country.'5
Although there are no reported cases interpreting the 1948 statute,
commentators noted a number of deficiencies. Procedurally, the
statute made no provision for compulsory process'6 or requests in any
form other than depositions, 7 and the inflexible requirement that
federal procedure be followed in the taking of depositions could
conceivably have rendered the evidence useless in a foreign court. 8
Another important restriction limited judicial assistance to
proceedings actually pending in a foreign court. This limitation
thereby excluded requests in cases not formally initiated, and requests
"Jones, supra note 3, at 556-58. One recent exception to American abstinence from judicial
assistance treaties is the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, open for signatures and signed by the United States
Nov. 15, 1965, ratified by the Senate April 14, 1967.4 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 338 (1965). The
provisions of this treaty are similar to 28 U.S.C. § 1695 (1964).
2 Act of Mar. 2, 1855, ch. 140, § 2, 10 Stat. 630.
"Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 95, § 1, 12 Stat. 769.
"See, e.g.,. Janssen v. Belding-Corticelli, Ltd., 84 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1936); In re Letters
Rogatory From Examining Magistrate of Tribunal of Versailles, France, 26 F. Supp. 852 (D.
Md. 1939); In re Letters Rogatory of Republic of Colombia, 4 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1933);
In re Letters Rogatory from First District Judge of Vera Cruz, 36 F. 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1888);
Spanish Counsul's Petition, 22 F. Cas. 854 (No. 13,202) (S.D.N.Y. 1867).
"1 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 117, § 1782, 62 Stat. 949. A 1949 amendment broadened this
statute by deleting the word "residing" and by substituting 'Judicial proceeding" for "civil
action." Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 93, 63 Stat. 103.
"Jones, supra note 3, at 542.
'
7 Smit, International Litigation Under the United States Code, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1015,
1027-28 (1965).
"1 Jones, supra note 3, at 542; Smit, supra note 17, at 1027-28. For example, interrogation of
a witness by anyone other than a judge might make the testimony useless in a court which
permitted only judicial interrogation.
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from quasi-judicial administrative and investigatory bodies and
international tribunals.'9
A movement to reform United States procedures for judicial
cooperation resulted in the congressionally-created Commission on
International Rules of Judicial Procedure. 0 The statutes dealing with
judicial assistance were rewritten by the commission2' and were
enacted verbatim by Congress in 1964.2 In the new version of section
1782, federal courts are provided with the discretionary power to
order persons residing or found within the district to produce
statements, documents or testimony for use in a proceeding in a
foreign or international tribunal. The statute permits district courts to
follow any procedure prescribed by the tribunal requesting assistance,
and expressly allows for the voluntary production of evidence without
court intervention. It also stipulates that "[a] person may not be
compelled to give his testimony or statement or to produce a
document or other thing in violation of any legally applicable
privilege."' 3 Furthermore, the term "tribunal," rather than "court,"
was selected by the drafting committee to expand the nature and
"1 Jones, supra note 3, at 542; Smit, supra note 17, at 1027. Doubt was expressed as to whether
the 1949 amendments allowed for aid to the Frenchjuges d'instruction. Jones, supra note 3, at
542; Mueller, supra note 8, at 205. Conira, 4 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 28.09(2) (2d ed.
1967).
" Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-906, 72 Stat. 1743.
2' See generally FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL
RULES OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE, H.R. Doc. No. 88, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) [hereinafter
cited as FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT].
22 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1964) (amended to apply to perjury committed outside the United States
before any person authorized by law to administer an oath); id. at § 3491 (amended to facilitate
the introduction of foreign documents into evidence); 28 U.S.C. § 1696 (enacted to allow district
court cooperation with foreign courts in the service of process within the United States); id. at §
1741 (amended to comply with FED. R. CIV. P. 44); id. at § 1745 (amended to facilitate the
authentication of foreign patents); id. at § 1781 (amended to clarify Department of State pro-
cedures for transmitting foreign letters rogatory); id. at § 1782 (amended to broaden United
States assistance to foreign and international tribunals); id. at § 1783 (amended to provide for
the service of federal subpoenas in foreign countries); id. at § 1784 (amended to provide prose-
cution for contempt as the enforcement machinery for § 1783).
"28 U.S.C. § 1782(a)(1964). The privilege provision, which replaces that formerly found in
28 U.S.C. § 1785, is another aspect of § 1782 which will require judicial construction. The scope
given to the privilege will have a direct bearing upon the usefulness of the statute. In com-
menting on the scope of the privilege, the committee reports state that there should at least be
"a reasonable connection between the person asked to produce evidence and the state or coun-
try under the laws of which he claims the possible incrimination. Among the factors which the
court may consider in determining the existence of such a connection are nationality, domicile,
forum, and the place of relevant events." S. REP. No. 1580, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1964);
FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT 52; H.R. REP. No. 1052,88th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1963).
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number of governmental bodies eligible for aid under section 1782.
The committee report stated:
The word "tribunal" is used to make it clear that assistance is not
confined to proceedings before conventional courts . . . .In view of
the constant growth of administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings
all over the world, the necessity for obtaining evidence in the United
States may be as impelling in proceedings before a foreign adminis-
trative tribunal or quasi-judicial agency as in proceedings before a
conventional foreign court. [Section 1782] therefore provides the
possibility of United States judicial assistance in connection with all
such proceedings.24
The above modifications were intended by the committee to be part
of a general liberalization of United States procedures designed to
stimulate judicial cooperation in other countries.25
11 FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT 45; S. REP. No. 1580, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1964); H. R.
REP. No. 1052, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1963).
1 "Enactment of the proposed bill into law will constitute a major step in bringing the United
States to the forefront of nations adjusting their procedures to those of sister nations and thereby
providing equitable and efficacious procedures for the benefit of tribunals and litigants involved
in litigation with international aspects ....
"The Commission hopes that the initiative taken by the United States in improving its
procedures will invite foreign countries similarily to adjust their procedures." FOURTH
ANNUAL REPORT 19-20; S. REP. No. 1580, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1964); H. R. REP.
No. 1052, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1963).
Letters rogatory have traditionally concluded with a promise to grant similar assistance if
requested. Thus, a request for aid is properly made only by a court with sufficient general
jurisdiction to be able to perform on the promise. Jones, supra note 3, at 532-33. This
requirement of reciprocity has been compared with the role of reciprocity in the recognition of
foreign judgments. See In re Letters Rogatory Issued by the Director of Inspection of the
Government of India, 385 F.2d 1017, 1022 (2d Cir. 1967). The application of a reciprocity
requirement to the recognition of foreign judgments was first enunciated in Hilton v. Guyot, 159
U.S. 113 (1895). In Hilton, the Supreme Court held that an in personam judgment obtained in a
foreign court by a foreigner against an American citizen need not be recognized unless the
foreign country would recognize a similar American judgment. Id. at 227-28. The limited
holding of Hilton has not been reaffirmed by the Court, and the Court has refused to extend the
reciprocity requirement. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 412
(1964). In addition, it has been criticized by commentators. E.g., H. GOODRIcH, CONFLICT OF
LAWs 605-08 (3d ed. 1949); Reese, The Status in This Country of Judgments RenderedAbroad,
50 COLUM. L. REv. 783,793 (1950); Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in
the United States, 9 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 44,49-50 (1962).
The holding in Hilton suggests that a possible rationale behind the decision was to protect
American citizens from extensive vulnerability in foreign courts. However, the stated reason was
to induce other nations to give conclusive effect to judgments rendered in this country. 159 U.S.
at 228. International judicial assistance is not a sub-species of the recognition of foreign
judgments. It is not inconsistent to grant assistance in a particular case and then to deny
recognition to the judgment issued in the same case. For example, the judgment may have been
Vol. 1968: 9811
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In the first case decided under the 1964 version of section 1782, the
Second Circuit focused upon the scope of the term "tribunal." '26 In the
Jain case, the Director of Inspection, the chief officer in the income
tax structure of India, sent a letter rogatory to the district court for
the Southern District of New York requesting that a commissioner be
appointed to secure testimony and documents from two New York
banks.2 The evidence was to be used by an Indian Income-Tax Officer
in the income tax assessment hearing of an Indian citizen." A motion
to vacate the order appointing the commissioner, and to quash a
procured by fraud or may be contrary to natural justice or public policy. Reese, supra, at 793-
800 (1950). Thus, a requirement of reciprocity in the recognition of foreign judgments suggests a
similar requirement for judicial assistance only if the rationale supporting the reciprocity
requirement in the case of foreign judgments is also appropriate to judicial assistance. However,
the need to protect American citizens does not apply to judicial assistance. The statute provides
for a discretionary application by district courts, see text accompanying floteg 70-71 infra,
and granting assistance does not require the recognition of the subsequent judgment. Cf
Smit, supra note 17, at 1022-23. The idea that reciprocity promotes cooperation is likewise
questionable. It is equally likely to be used as a rationale for retaliation, and, at best, it tends
to promote a stalemate. In any case, the committee reports on § 1782 make it clear that the
statute was designed to eliminate the reciprocity requirement and to provide for United
States initiative in granting assistance. See. e.g., FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT.
26 In re Letters Rogatory Issued by the Director of Inspection of the Government of India, 385
F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1967) [hereinafter referred to as the Jain case]. While the Jain case is the
first reported decision since 1964 which directly considers § 1782, the statute has been used by
foreign tribunals. The dockets of the district court for the Southern District of New York list
forty-four requests for judicial assistance under § 1782 received in 1964, twenty-five of which
were from India. Letter -from Jeremiah A. Murphy, Administrative Assistant to the Clerk,
Southern District of New York, March 19, 1968, on file in the DUKE LAW JOURNAL offices.
27 The United States has entered into a number of tax treaties designed to avoid double
taxation, regulate the extent to which foreign tax laws will be enforced by United States courts,
and provide for the exchange of information for tax enforcement. E.g., Double Taxation
Agreement with Belgium, Sept. 9, 1952, [1953] 2 U.S.T. 1647. A similar treaty with India,
which would have covered the Jain casewas signed on Nov. 10, 1959, but was withdrawn by the
United States as unacceptable on June 8, 1964. A new treaty was negotiated but has not been
signed. CCH TAX TREATIas 3802.
21 Nations and states have frequently refused to allow their courts to be used to enforce foreign
tax laws, often citing the rule that a country never takes notice of the revenue laws of another
country. E.g., Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1929), affd on other grounds, 281 U.S.
18 (1930); Colorado v. Harbeck, 232 N.Y. 71, 133 N.E. 357 (1921); In re Estate of McNeel,
170 N.Y.S.2d 893 (Sur. Ct. 1957); United States v. Harden, 1963 Can. S. Ct. 366; Govern-
ment of India v. Taylor, [1955] A.C. 491; see Robertson, Extraterritorial Enforcement of Tax
Obligations, 7 ARIZ. L. REv. 219 (1966). But see Detroit v. Gould, 12 Ill. 2d 297, 146 N.E.
2d 61 (1957); Ohio v. Arnett, 314 Ky. 403, 234 S.W.2d 722 (1950); State v. Rodgers, 238 Mo.
App. 1115, 193 S.W.2d 919 (1946). The enforcement of foreign tax laws, however, must be
distinguished from the Jain case which involved a request for judicial assistance in securing
evidence to be used by a foreign country to enforce its own tax laws.
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subpoena issued to one of the banks, was denied by the district court.2 9
That court reasoned that the Indian Income-Tax Officer, who decided
disputes and was empowered and obligated to act in a quasi-judicial
manner, was a "tribunal" entitled to the aid provided by section
1782.30 On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the
Indian Tax Officer was not a tribunal.'
The court of appeals developed two arguments in support of its
conclusion regarding the nature of the Tax Officer. The first argu-
ment focused upon the similarities between the United States and
Indian income tax procedures. The court observed that while the
United States Tax Court, an "independent agency," would be a tri-
bunal, neither an Internal Revenue agent nor the Appellate Division
of the Internal Revenue Service is the type of body Congress would
have considered a tribunal under section 1782.32 Although IRS
agents and the Appellate Division call witnesses, compel testimony,
punish for contempt, and are obligated to act fairly and impartially,
they "remain tax collectors and not adjudicators." 33 Since the Indian
Tax Officer has similar procedural powers with respect to witnesses,
and has similar duties of impartiality, "Congress would thus not
have expected that 28 U.S.C. § 1782 could be invoked by . . . [the
Tax Officer]. '34
While indeed there are some similarities in the powers and duties
of Indian Tax Officers and Internal Revenue agents, there are
significant differences between the Indian and United States income
tax systems which the court failed to recognize, and which suggest
that the Indian Tax Officer is actually more analogous to the United
States Tax Court. Unlike the Indian Tax system, in which the initial
assessment of the tax due is made by the Income-Tax Officer either on
the basis of the taxpayer's return or after a hearing,35 the United
States system is based upon self-assessment. 6 The procedures of the
Internal Revenue Service come into play only if the taxpayer's return
is selected for review and a deficiency or inaccuracy is discovered.
Conferences with agents in district offices and proceedings before the
29272 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
'DId. at 762.
3j 385 F.2d 1017.
32 Id. at 1021.
" Id.
uId.
"' INDIAN INCOME-TAX Ac? OF 1961, § 143 (Jain 1962).
"See Internal Rev. Prac., 26"C.F.R. § 601.103(a) (1968).
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Appellate Division are informal" and the emphasis is upon
settlement." Any assessment made by an agent or the Appellate
Division is only a proposal. Unless the taxpayer consents or waives his
right of appeal, no collection can be made on the basis of the proposed
assessment39 and it has no binding effect upon either party.40 If the
taxpayer's self-assessment is rejected, and he refuses the agent's or
Appellate Division's proposed assessment or settlement offer, the
actual assessment of tax due is made by the Tax Court.4 Thus the
informality of the proceedings, the emphasis upon settlement, the
provisions for compromise, and the tentative nature of any assessment
made by an agent or the Appellate Division contrasts markedly with
the procedural aspects of the Indian Tax system. The procedures
followed by the Indian Tax Officer are far more formal,42 and he has
the duty to make a binding assessment subject to appeal only by the
taxpayer.4 3 While a superficial comparison might support the findings
of the Second Circuit in Jain, these basic differences suggest that the
Tax Officer is more analogous to the United States Tax Court.
A second argument relied upon by the court of appeals in denying
the Indian Tax Officer's status as a tribunal emphasized the
differences between the Tax Officer and the types of bodies Congress
intended to include under the term "tribunal." Specifically, the court
referred to the French juge d'instruction, whose status as a tribunal is
recognized in the Committee reports on section 1782. 44 The distinction
stressed by the court is that the Tax Officer, in contrast to thejuge
d'instruction, has the sole responsibility for both making and
evaluating the government's case. This "absence of any degree of
separation between the prosecutorial and adjudicative functions" is
suggested by the court as a useful guideline for distinguishing
"Seeid.at§ 601.106(c).
'Seeid. at §§ 601.105(c) (3), 601.106(d).
9 I NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6213(a).
Uinta Livestock Corp. v. United States, 355 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1966); Joyce v. Gentsch,
141 F.2d 891 (6th Cir. 1944).
4i See Internal Rev. Prac., 26 C.F.R. § 601.103(c) (2) (1968).
42 See notes 57-64 infra and accompanying text.
" INDIAN IN COME-TAX ACT OF 1961, § 246 (Jain 1962).
" The committee reports on § 1782 refer to the large number of requests for aid coming from
"Investigating Magistrates" and cite to a speech by Lelievre reported in LETTERs ROGATOItY-A
SYMPosIUM 9 (Grossman ed. 1956), which discusses the requests for aid from French juges
d'instruction. The reports state that "tribunal" is designed to include such magistrates. S. REP.
No. 1580, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1964); FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT 45; H.R. REP. No. 1052,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1963).
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administrators who are not tribunals under section 1782 from those
who do qualify.45 Because the statute is concerned with judicial
assistance, this guideline appears to lead to the conclusion that
tribunals are predominantly adjudicative bodies.
This test and its application by the court, however, are of
questionable validity. The objections stem from the court's
misconception regarding the functions of thejuge d'instruction. The
juge, who holds a position in French criminal law roughly analogous
to that of a grand jury, conducts the entire investigation of criminal
cases including decisions as to the type and scope of investigation to
be carried out.46 In so doing the juge constructs the dossier which
constitutes the complete basis upon which the decision is made
whether or not to prosecute the accused. 47 However, contrary to the
belief of the circuit court,48 thejuge does not make this decision in any
cases other than minor crimes. Rather, the decision is ordinarily made
by the Chambre d'accusation.49 Thus, it can be argued that thejuge
d'instruction, by conducting the investigation and compiling the
dossier, constructs the government's case against the accused, and
that therefore, his function is basically prosecutorial. On the other
hand, he does make rulings regarding testimony and evidence, decides
what direction the investigation is to follow and what is to be
contained in the dossier, and recommends whether the accused should
be prosecuted. In these respects his function is adjudicative. If the
position of juge d'instruction is viewed broadly in terms of its
prosecutorial and adjudicative characteristics, one must conclude that
it combines both functions. However, if a predominant function must
be identified, it would appear to center around the prosecutorial
aspect. In either case, under the test applied by the Second Circuit, the
juge would fail to qualify as a tribunal. He would be excluded either
because his function was merely prosecutorial, or because it lacked
"separation between its prosecutorial and adjudicative aspects." Yet
the committee report on section 1782 clearly evidences a
congressional intent to include the juge d'instruction as a tribunal."
"S 385 F.2d at 1021.
4" Anton, L'Instruction Criminelle, 9 AM. J. ComIP. L. 441,444 (1960).
41 Id. at 454-55.
1 385 F.2d at 1020.
49 Anton, supra note 46, at 455; Keedy, The Preliminary Investigation of Crime in France,
88 U. PA. L. REV. 385, 727 (1940); Ploscowe, The Investigating Magistrate (Juge d'Instruc-
tion) in European Criminal Procedure, 33 MICH. L. REV. 1010, 1026-27 (1935).
10 See note 44 supra.
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Thus, it would seem that a test which excludes a foreign governmental
body from assistance solely because it has some prosecutorial
functions, or because it combines both prosecution and adjudication,
would conflict with the express intent of Congress in passing section
1782.
Since the prosecutorial-adjudicative test of the appeals court
appears inadequate, a new test must be found. The legislative history
of the 1964 amendments contains three suggestions regarding the
construction of "tribunal." The statement in the committee reports
regarding the growing significance of proceedings before
"investigating magistrates," "administrative tribunals" and "quasi-
judicial agencies," and the fact that the statute was designed to
provide assistance "in all such proceedings,'"' makes it clear that
section 1782 was not intended to be limited to formal court
proceedings. While this statement gives some indication as to the
scope of the coverage intended, it provides little assistance in defining
"tribunal" in concrete situations.
A second suggestion is found in the committee reference to the
1939 Draft Convention on Judicial Assistance which uses the term
"tribunal" in a context similar to section 1782.52 That draft defines
"tribunal" as "a judicial authority, or an administrative authority
while engaged in the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions
'M The comments following this definition state that an
administrative agency which exercises both administrative and quasi-
judicial functions is a tribunal "only in connection with an exercise of
its quasi-judicial functions . . . ."I Since the proper classification of
the Indian Tax Officer's one basic function, assessment, is a major
issue in Jain, this definition only restates rather than resolves the
problem." Nevertheless, it is helpful when applied to agencies which
have more than one basic function. If, for example, an agency was
preparing a report for a legislative body, it would not be entitled to use
1, S. REP. No. 1580, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1964); FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT 45; H.R.
REP. No. 1052, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1963).
S2 Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Judicial Assistance, 33 AM.
J. INV'L L. 15 (Supp. 1939).
51 Id.
Id. at 39.
The court of appeals described the Indian Tax Officer's duties as a combination of
prosecutorial and adjudicative functions. 385 F.2d at 1020-21. Since, however, these functions
are an inseparable part of his duties, in that they are performed virtually simultaneously, the
analysis suggested by the definition in the Draft Convention cannot be applied.
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section 1782. If, however, the same agency was deciding a dispute or
making a ruling, it would be a tribunal and could apply for assistance
under the section.
Despite the problems encountered by the Second Circuit, the
apparent intention of Congress to include thejuge d'instruction within
the term "tribunal"56 may still provide a useful basis upon which to
define the scope of aid available under section 1782. Since thejuge
combines both prosecutorial and adjudicative functions, the test for
distinguishing tribunals cannot be whether the body in question is
primarily adjudicative. Rather, to structure a proper test, the function
of thejuge d'instruction must be assessed in light of the manner and
context in which he operates. Like ajuge therefore, 57 a tribunal should
function in a judicial manner-call and interrogate witnesses, make
rulings, collect, analyze and evaluate evidence, and be obligated to act
in a fair and impartial manner. Secondly, a tribunal should operate
within the context of an actual case or dispute. It should complete its
duties by either making a decision regarding the parties before it, or
by preparing a case which forms the factual data upon which a ruling
affecting the actual parties is made.58 The first criterion works to in-
sure that the information sought by judicial assistance will be used in
a judicious manner. The second limits judicial assistance to cases
which directly affect actual parties.
When these criteria are applied to the Indian Income-Tax Officer,
a conclusion opposite that of the Jain court is reached. The Tax
Officer works in a judicial manner. 9 He must act fairly and
impartially,60 he calls witnesses, orders them to testify,6 punishes for
contempt,62 follows the basic rules of judicial procedure,63 has powers
of discovery,64 and makes a decision based upon the evidence. 65 The
"See note 45 supra.
" See notes 47-50 supra and accompanying text.
"See Smit, supra note 17, at 1026 n.7 1.
M. KAGZI, THE INDIAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 82 (1962); 1 J. KANGA & B. PALKHIVALA,
THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INCOME TAX 638 (5th ed. 1963); M. KHARBANDA, COMMEN-
TARY ON THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961 at 239 (1963).
60 1 J. KANGA & B. PALKHIVALA, supra note 59, at 639; M. KHARBANDA, supra note 59, at
239.
" INDIAN INCOME-TAX ACTOF 1961, § 131 (Jain 1962).
IJd.at § 136.
"M. KHARBANDA, supra note 59, at 239; V. SUNDARAM, THE LAW OF INCOME-TAx IN INDIA
806 (9th ed. 1963).
"INDIAN INCOME-TAX ACT OF 1961, § 131 (Jain 1962).
11 M. KHARBANDA, supra note 59, at 239.
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information sought by the Tax Officer is needed to decide a particular
case and he concludes his duties by making an assessment of the tax
due from a particular taxpayer . 6 Thus, a close comparison of the
characteristics of the Indian Tax Officer to those of the juge
d'instruction indicates that the Tax Officer should likewise be
included within the scope of section 1782.
In seeking to define "tribunal," there appear to be two conflicting
policy considerations troubling the courts. The first is the interest in
protecting persons within the jurisdiction of the district court, and the
court itself, from undue inconvenience and interruption in having to
testify or produce documents and statements. If any foreign
governmental body, whether court or agency, could use section 1782
for any reason, there is a possibility of overuse, indiscretion, invasions
of privacy, or general abuse of judicial processes. This consideration,
while not overriding, supports a narrow interpretation of section 1782
that limits its use to bodies making determinations in actual cases."
A second policy, one which suggests a broad application, relates to
the fact that the 1964 amendments were designed to encourage liberal
judicial assistance statutes in other countries.6 s A narrow
interpretation of section 1782 would minimize the impact of the
statute as an encouragement to the enactment of such statutes by
foreign nations. Moreover, the scope afforded section 1782 is likely to
influence the interpretation of similar statutes by foreign courts. This
impact is most obvious in the case of a decision against cooperation.
Although granting assistance under section 1782 in the Jain case
would not assure that the Indian courts would respond favorably to
an American request (assuming India has a statute similar to section
1782), it would be significant precedent. Alternatively, a refusal of
cooperation would surely preclude any assistance for an American tax
official.69 This consideration suggests that, at a minimum, aid should
be given in any case where the United States might need foreign court
assistance in a similar situation.
INDIAN INCOME-TAx ACT OF 1961, § 143(3) (Jain 1962).
67 Even though this policy consideration does suggest a narrow interpretation, it would not
preclude a finding that in fact the Indian Income Tax Officer is a tribunal.
6 Cf. Lenhoff, Reciprocity: The LegalAspect of a Perennial Idea, 49 Nw. U.L. REV. 619,626
(1954); see note 26 supra and accompanying text.
" A refusal to grant assistance in response to a denial of aid would properly be termed
"retorsion"-a lawful act, in response to a legal but undesired act, taken for the purpose of
inducing the other state to change its policy. Lenhoff, supra note 68, at 629.
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The interpretation of "tribunal" given by the Second Circuit
unduly narrows the intended scope of section 1782. While this
construction might be rationalized on the ground that it protects
United States courts and residents from abusive use of the statute,
such a conclusion completely overlooks the statute's explicit
discretionary nature. 0 A district court is not obligated to grant every
request from each body believed to be a qualified tribunal. The
committee reports on the bill make it clear that the district court, in
exercising its discretion, may consider the nature and attitude of the
country from which the request emanates, as well as the character of
the proceedings involved. Furthermore, in granting assistance, the
court may impose terms regarding counsel fees, attendance fees for
witnesses, fees for interpreters and transcribers and similar
provisions. 7' In close cases, limiting the use of the statute by an
exercise of this discretionary power, rather than through a
destructively narrow interpretation of "tribunal," would allow for a
more flexible and useful statute.
28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1964).
"S. REP. No. 1580, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1964); FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT 45; H.R. REP.
No. 1052, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1963).
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